Forming coalitions to negotiate North-South climate agreements

Forming coalitions to negotiate North-South climate agreements / Alejandro Caparrós and Jean-Christophe Péreau. Environment and Development Economics, Vol. 18, Special Issue 01, February 2013, pp 69-92

http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=8826821

This paper analyzes North-South negotiations over climate change abatement. We consider that northern countries have an incentive to negotiate over a transfer to the southern countries in exchange for their abatement efforts rather than reducing their emissions at home. We study the incentives for northern and southern countries to form negotiation-coalitions at each side of the bargaining table and the impact of these negotiation-coalitions on the final outcome. We show that the incentives can be separated into direct efficiency gains, as fixed costs savings, and indirect bargaining power gains. Depending on the relative values of these gains, we determine the equilibrium of the game. We also show that bargaining power gains encourage southern countries to negotiate separately while they encourage northern countries to unite, and that this hinders the formation of the grand coalition. (© Alejandro Caparrós and Jean-Christophe Péreau)


OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (31 janvier 2013). Forming coalitions to negotiate North-South climate agreements. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 21 juillet 2024 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/oa3z


Vous aimerez aussi...

Laisser un commentaire

Votre adresse e-mail ne sera pas publiée. Les champs obligatoires sont indiqués avec *

Ce site utilise Akismet pour réduire les indésirables. En savoir plus sur comment les données de vos commentaires sont utilisées.

Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search