Bureaucratic influence when secretariats grow : the example of the UNFCCC
Bureaucratic influence when secretariats grow: The example of the UNFCCC / Axel and Katharina Michaelowa. Zurich : Center for Comparative and International Studies, 2013, 31 p. (CIS Working Paper 80/2013)
http://www.cis.ethz.ch/publications/publications/wp80MichaelowaUNFCC.pdf
The CDM revenues have led to a massive resource inflow for the UNFCCC Secretariat, covering more than half of its budget. Using document analysis, interviews and regression analysis, we show that the UNFCCC Secretariat, at least in areas that require technical expertise and that are politically not overly contentious, can gain substantial influence over concrete CDM-related policy decisions and even change the structure of decision making and consultation processes. We also show that this may reinforce rather than reduce the role of special interests expressed via country delegates in the CDM EB. While one might be worried about the erosion of democratic principles at the international level, from a normative perspective, the overall effect is difficult to assess. If the international UNFCCC staff is well trained, technically competent, and committed to the delivery of the global public good of climate change mitigation, its increasing autonomy and influence may also be socially advantageous. (© Michaelowa)
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (23 mai 2013). Bureaucratic influence when secretariats grow : the example of the UNFCCC. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 12 septembre 2024 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/oad9
