Terminating links between emission trading programs
Terminating links between emission trading programs / William A. Pizer & Andrew J. Yates. Resources for the Future, Aug. 2014, 43 p. (RFF Discussion Paper 14-28)
http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22430
Links between emission trading programs are not immutable, as highlighted by New Jersey’s exit from the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. This raises the question of what to do with existing permits that are banked for future use—choices that have consequences for market behavior in advance of, or upon speculation about, delinking. We consider two delinking policies. One differentiates banked permits by origin, the other treats banked permits the same. We describe the price behavior and relative cost-effectiveness of each policy. Treating permits differently generally leads to higher costs, and may lead to price divergence, even with only speculation about delinking. (© the authors)
Presentation, by the paper’s authors :
In the absence of a coordinated global emissions market, a number of self-contained regional carbon-trading programs have formed that independently establish, track, and cancel their own compliance permits. In order to increase the cost-effectiveness, liquidity, and stability of these markets, the entities that control them may choose to link programs together in a framework that allows permits to be unilaterally or bilaterally accepted across joined systems… read more on Common resources
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (2 septembre 2014). Terminating links between emission trading programs. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 19 septembre 2024 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/ob7r
