Tax policy in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model with pollution permits
Tax policy in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model with pollution permits / Bertrand Crettez, Pierre-André Jouvet et Ludovic A. Julie, Chaire Economie du climat, Paris Dauphine, 2014, 34 p. (série recherche n°2014-13)
Authors’s abstract :
We introduce a pollution permits market in a general oligopoly equilibrium model. Specifically, we consider a two-commodity economy with one productive sector. The first commodity is inelastically supplied by a set of competitive traders. The second commodity is produced by a set of strategic traders, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. Introducing a competitive emissions permits market solves the pollution control problem but is not sufficient to eliminate market distortions and to reach a Pareto optimal allocation. We study the conditions under which a subsidy to the strategic agents, financed by a tax on the competitive agents, is welfare increasing.
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (29 septembre 2014). Tax policy in a simple general oligopoly equilibrium model with pollution permits. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 4 octobre 2024 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/ob9v
