On the Timing of Climate Agreements

On the Timing of Climate Agreements / Robert C. Schmidt and Roland Strausz. Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, July 2014, 42 p. (SFB 649 Discussion Paper 2014-044)

http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2014-044.pdf

Authors’s abstract :

A central issue in climate policy is the question whether long-term targets for greenhouse gas emissions should be adopted. This paper analyzes strategic effects related to the timing of such commitments. Using a two-country model, we identify a redistributive effect that undermines long-term cooperation when countries are asymmetric and side payments are unavailable. The effect enables countries to shift rents strategically via their R&D efforts under delayed cooperation. In contrast, a complementarity effect stabilizes long-term cooperation, because early commitments in abatement induce countries to invest more in low-carbon technologies, and create additional knowledge spillovers. Contrasting both effects, we endogenize the timing of climate agreements.



Citer ce billet
Danièle Revel (2014, 13 octobre). On the Timing of Climate Agreements. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 20 avril 2024, à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/obbl

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