Security of Supply, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors
Security of Supply, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors / David Newbery. Cambridge : Energy Policy Research Group, Feb. 2015, 16 p. (EPRG working paper ; 1508)
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/EPRG-WP-1508.pdf
Author’s Abstract :
Energy policy aims to deliver security, sustainability and affordability, but politicians treat security of supply as over-riding. Absent market and regulatory failures, liberalized energy-only electricity markets might deliver adequate capacity. Ambitious targets for subsidized renewables and policy uncertainty have undermined the commercial case for the investment needed to handle increased intermittency and raised concerns for capacity adequacy. In response Britain now holds annual capacity auctions. The paper examines the case for, criticisms of, and the outcome of the first auction, criticizing the decision to ignore the contribution that interconnectors make to security of supply.
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (11 mars 2015). Security of Supply, Capacity Auctions and Interconnectors. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 16 janvier 2025 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/oboc
