Oil, governance and the (mis)allocation of talent in developing countries

This paper sheds light on the relationship between oil rent and the allocation of talent, toward rent-seeking versus more productive activities, conditional on the quality of institutions. Using a sample of 69 developing countries, we demonstrate that oil resources orient university students toward specializations that provide better future access to rents when institutions are weak. The results are robust to various specifications, datasets on governance quality and estimation methods. Oil affects the demand for each profession through a technological effect, indicating complementarity between oil and engineering, manufacturing and construction; however, it also increases the ‘size of the cake’. Therefore, when institutions are weak, oil increases the incentive to opt for professions with better access to rents (law, business, and the social sciences), rather than careers in engineering, creating a deviation from the optimal allocation between the two types of specialization.

A ce propos :

Comment éviter la “malédiction” des ressources naturelles ? / Rachid Laajaj, chercheur à l’Ecole d’Economie de Paris et à l’INRA, Christian Ebeke, économiste au Fonds Monétaire International et
Luc Désiré Omgba, maître de conférences en sciences économiques à l’Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, la Tribune, 12/03/2015 http://www.latribune.fr/opinions/tribunes/comment-eviter-la-malediction-des-ressources-naturelles-459252.html

De nombreux pays à fortes ressources naturelles -pétrole, notamment- affichent des croissances économiques plus faibles que les autres. Cette « malédiction des ressources naturelles » tient notamment au fait que la rente pétrolière détourne les talents des activités productives…