A mechanism design approach to climate agreements
A mechanism design approach to climate agreements / D. Martimort and W. Sand-Zantman. IDEI, Sept. 2011, 43 p. ( Working Paper No. 682).
http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2011/warm_md-210911.pdf
We analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly limited enforcement. Taking a mechanism design perspective, we study how countries can agree on effort levels and compensations to take into account multilateral externalities. We delineate conditions for efficient agreements and trace out possible inefficiencies to the conjectures that countries hold following disagreement. We show how optimal mechanisms admit simple approximations with attractive implementation properties. Finally, we also highlight how limits on commitment strongly hinder performances of optimal mechanisms.
OpenEdition vous propose de citer ce billet de la manière suivante :
Danièle Revel (25 octobre 2011). A mechanism design approach to climate agreements. Veille énergie climat. Consulté le 15 octobre 2024 à l’adresse https://doi.org/10.58079/o981
