This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic “World Climate Assembly” that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered…
Is it possible to combat global climate change through North-to-South technology transfer even without a global climate treaty? Or do carbon leakage and the rebound effect imply that it is possible to take advantage of technological improvements under the umbrella of a global arrangement only?…
Lire à ce propos : Les changements climatiques, à la poursuite des coupables, Enerzine, 30/01/2014
The Green Paradox states that a gradually more ambitious climate policy such as a renewables subsidy or an anticipated carbon tax induces fossil fuel owners to extract more rapidly and accelerate global warming. However, if extraction becomes more costly as reserves are depleted, such policies also shorten the fossil fuel era, induce more fossil fuel to be left in the earth and thus curb cumulative carbon emissions…
This book chapter provides an historical and legal introduction to the UN climate change regime
This essay of Daniel Bodansky unpacks the elements of the Durban platform and analyzes the possible goals of the new round of negotiations. It then examines three possible models of how international law might address climate change…
This article investigates how the choices of the instruments affects the interactions in a stock externality game (global warming) between cartelized fossil fuel suppliers and consumers
The authors analyze environmental agreements in contexts with asymmetric information, voluntary participation by sovereign countries and possibly limited enforcement
The authors’s main message is that it is optimal to use less coal and more oil once one takes account ofcoal being a backstop which emits much more CO2 than oil
Proceedings of the Second International Symposium of Global COE Program “Energy Science in the Age of Global Warming—Toward CO2 Zero-emission Energy System”
The authors offer a framework to assign quantitative allocations of emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), across countries, one budget period at a time…
This paper for the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements analyzes the options going forward, including adoption of a legally-binding second commitment period, a “political” second commitment period, or no new commitment period.
An Initial Assessment of Socio-Economic Consequences of Present and Climate Change Induced Flood Risks and of Possible Adaptation Options
New Economics Papers Energy Economics (REPEC)
